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Introduction: 
In recent years the fairly new field of Animal Studies has received considerable 
attention (see bibliography). In view of the growing number of pet owners, the 
increasing visibility of animal rights activists, the media exposure of inhumane 
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animal experiments, a heightened awareness of the ecological and ethical 
implications of raising enormous quantities of animals for food consumption, the 
disappearance of species, hunting practices, deprivation of habitats, the 
harvesting of animal organs for medical purposes, the destruction of eco-systems 
and other human interferences, our relationship to non-human beings keeps 
changing considerably. In other words, attempts at defining the human versus  
the animal have to be considered as transitory; and yet certain essential 
categories have endured for long periods of time: for instance, the Cartesian 
distinction between thinking and non-thinking creatures that can be traced back 
to Aristotle and still influences our attitudes towards animals today. 
The somewhat provocative title of this volume, Defining the Human and 
the Animal, could be misunderstood as an attempt at providing clear-cut 
definitions between humans and animals. Far from seeking to define the human 
or the animal, however, the volume engages with established literary, 
philosophical, and scientific texts that have shaped ongoing and historic debates 
surrounding the human-animal divide. As the contributors’ diverse approaches 
will show, definitions of what is human are always projections and depend on 
specific social, political, scientific, literary, and ethical frames of reference. 
Keeping the historical and subjective nature of such projections in mind, this 
volume examines how various textual examples from different genres and 
periods of European literature and philosophy reveal specific ideological and 
aesthetic presumptions in depicting the human-animal divide. 
In the eighteenth century, some remarkable changes took place in 
European thought suggesting that human life and animal life have much more in 
common than previously assumed. British utilitarian philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham’s (1748-1832) famous dictum “The question is not, Can they [animals] 
reason, nor, Can they talk, but, Can they suffer?” appealed to human empathy by 
stressing animals’ neural and emotional capacity for feeling pain. If the sole 
distinction between humans and animals was the ability to reason, so Bentham’s 
argument goes, infants or mentally handicapped persons could not be 
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considered to be human, either. He thus posited a different mode for thinking 
about humans and animals. 
The growing awareness of the similarities between animals and humans in 
the eighteenth century can be attributed to a number of factors. For instance, the 
discovery of the nervous system was initially confirmed through animal 
experiments and recognized as a common transmitter of sensations in animals 
and humans alike. In view of their common neurological apparatus one was able 
to assume that both humans and animals have similar sensations. The 
heightened awareness of physiological similarities between humans and non- 
humans made it necessary to discover other distinctive traits. Consequently, 
ethical and metaphysical distinctions came into focus. The ability of humans to 
make autonomous decisions – decisions that are independent of the instincts or 
in defiance of these – became a very important quality that distinguished the 
moral human being from the amoral animal. In Kantian philosophy, for instance, 
the human ability to resist the animal instincts became the marker of the human 
being’s moral integrity and freedom (Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie 
21-25). 
While individual autonomy presupposes a reliance on reason and a moral 
integrity that cannot be corrupted by emotional inclinations or sensual 
temptations, civilized human beings are also expected to have empathy with the 
less fortunate and weak. In fact, the empathetic identification with other living 
beings becomes a key ingredient of Enlightenment philosophy and the discourse 
on human rights. Many literary and philosophical texts of this time helped create 
a universal standard for what it means to be a civilized human being (see select 
bibliography: i.e. Kant, Herder, Schiller). The ethical and social norms that 
bourgeois individuals were expected to fulfill have come to be known as 
humanist values. While these values have served as a model for Western 
individuality and the human rights discourse, one has to be aware that they are 
constructs that emerged at a time when the middle classes established rules that 
would enable them to be on equal footing with members of the aristocracy, and 
thus to have a much greater share of power. 
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However, already in the nineteenth century during the course of 
industrialization and the rapid growth of urban centers with a large contingent of 
underprivileged laborers, the idealist notion of individual autonomy was becoming 
more elusive and ultimately lost credibility, as the fate and political rights of most 
members of society still depended on their economic and social status. Marxism 
attempted to do justice to the socio-economic realities by providing a materialist 
explanation of world history and challenging the idea that all would be able to be 
master of their destiny (Die deutsche Ideologie). Another factor that questioned 
the humanist outlook was the growing importance of empiricist methods. 
Discoveries in the so-called life sciences damaged the creationist myth, blurred 
the border between “Man” and animal, and discredited the assumption of the 
independence of the human mind (Darwin, Haeckel). With the realization that the 
mind is not independent from the body but the result of a late physiological 
development in the long history of evolution, individual self-mastery became even 
more of a myth. 
After Darwin’s theory of evolution had made it more difficult to distinguish 
the human species from non-human creatures, Nietzschean, Freudian, and 
Marxist philosophies challenged idealist universal explanations of what is human 
by subordinating empirical knowledge to their particular points of view. Their 
different anti-humanist approaches epitomized that there is no single, objective 
Truth. Yet despite the widely accepted assertion – held by both Marxists and 
Nietzscheans – that scientific analyses of perceived phenomena are subject to 
the historical, cultural, and ideological conditions from which they arose, 
empiricist methodologies and their claims to objectivity have prevailed to this day. 
Moreover, anthropocentric explanations of human sovereignty still persist. 
Whether the human-animal distinction is based on the human capacity for “world- 
making,” the ability to adapt to any environment through the inventive production 
of tools, the broader range of human communicative abilities through language, 
imagination, introspection, or the deliberate and meaningful transformation of the 
environment, ontological human-animal distinctions have been invoked 
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throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century to define the human in 
philosophical and scientific discourses. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The human pedigree interpreted chain of being with living and fossil animals. 
Ernst Haeckel, Anthropogenie oder Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen (The 
Evolution of Man), 1874, posted by Petter Bøckman, Wikipedia, Public Domain. 
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Figure 2: The Scala Naturae or ‘Ladder of Life’ according to the descriptions of Aristotle 
[digitized from Charles Singer, A Short History of Biology, via Roger Wotton Blog 
(http://rwotton.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/aristotle-natural-history-and- 
evolution_7.htm)] 
 
Darwin’s or Haeckel’s trees of life remind us in too many ways of Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s scala naturae or Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s great Chain of Beings to 
be called original. The persistence of these metaphorical distinctions seems to 
suggest that there are fundamental species-related human-animal distinctions 
that transcend social and cultural contingencies. Does the scientific employment 
of the tree metaphor to represent evolution and the hierarchical order of the 
species not suggest that science often relies on anthropomorphic imagery? And 
does this not mean that scientific theories are frequently informed by figments of 
the human imagination or sensual impressions? In other words, scientific 
knowledge seems to be intrinsically tied to sensory perceptions and ideas. 
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Certainly, it would not be difficult to point out the countless scientific discoveries 
that have successfully corrected irrational and flawed fabrications of the human 
imagination, such as the pre-Galilean theories of the genesis of the earth and its 
solar system. Yet, the development and continual correction of scientific 
knowledge throughout history suggests that scientific knowledge cannot 
transcend its anthropocentric limitations and, what is more, their particular socio- 
cultural contexts. For instance, who could seriously doubt that a human being 
who lived a few hundred years ago in central Africa had a different understanding 
of time, distance, and ethical conduct from a human being living in the U.S. 
today? In light of such differing sensations, emotions, and perceptions, it should 
be hardly a surprise that the human-animal border is continuously redefined, and 
yet intrinsically tied to projections of the human imagination. Scientific research is 
often based on such projections or must be transformed into metaphors to obtain 
palpability. For instance, human states of emotion, like fear or love, can be 
subject to scientific scrutiny. However, their sensory experience can be much 
more effectively communicated in poetic or even everyday language than in 
scientific prose. Mere scientific abstraction, albeit rationally understandable, 
remains distant and intangible. Without relating scientific data to phenomena of 
the human experience through metaphorical representations, science would be 
incomprehensible, as Goethe’s dictum “Gray is all science, and green is the 
golden tree of life” so vividly expresses (Goethe, Faust). In other words, just as 
Faust is inseparably tied to that creaturely Mephisto, so are our rational 
capacities grounded in our sensory, pre-reflexive experiences. 
Tracing the border between the human and the animal means reflecting 
on human attempts to come to grips with our inescapable yet desirable animal 
existence. And here lies the irony, which Jacques Derrida so lucidly evinced 
when he undressed in front of his cat and felt ashamed: it is the non-human 
animal that makes us human (The Animal That Therefore I am). By exploring the 
borders between human and animal in historical, philosophical, and literary 
contexts, this volume is focusing on a topic that is central to the humanities: 
namely the examination of attempts to create versions of the human subject by 
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comparing it to a pre-historic, unfathomable, creaturely life, which is both familiar 
and alien to us. Although such explorations of what is human will never be able 
to tell us what the human subject is, they will give us the opportunity to ponder 
both preconceptions and ideological implications of the incessant transformations 
of the human-animal border. 
 
In the first chapter of this volume, entitled “The Time of Animal Voices,” 
Ted Toadvine focuses on Maurice Merleau Ponty’s fundamental distinction 
between animal and human from a phenomenological point of view. Toadvine 
delineates how Merleau-Ponty was able to overcome the anthropo-logic of his 
early work by tracing his development and comparing it to Heidegger’s and 
Scheler’s essentialist human-animal distinctions. He shows how the philosophy 
of Merleau-Ponty allows for fundamental species distinctions without reverting to 
an anthropocentric essentialism based on the distinction of body and spirit. 
Rather than separating the animal from the human through narcissistic 
misrecognition, Merleau-Ponty follows in the footsteps of phenomenologist 
Edmund Husserl, who recognized “the Darwinian story of our common animal 
origins.” While Merleau-Ponty assumed in his early philosophy (The Structure of 
Behaviour, 1942) that life could be integrated into spirit, he asserts in his later 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945) that the “final integration of matter and life 
into spirit is unattainable.” Nevertheless, the imprint of our animal past continues 
to influence how we perceive the world on a pre-conscious level. 
The time factor comes into play in the description of the perceptual 
experience. What structures our perception is precisely this pre-reflective imprint 
of our animal past that can never be grasped in the present because it always 
precedes our conscious perception and transforms the structure of our 
consciousness with each new sensation. There is no stable I or self, but rather 
an “assemblage of natural selves” that has always already been synchronized 
with the world before one consciously perceives it. Consequently, the I is 
represented in concert with “the immemorial prehistory, the voices of the animals 
that we will have been” (Toadvine). Yet while the perceiving I is always 
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synchronized with the pre-conscious animal past, the present acting subject is 
always belated in its attempts to regain synchronicity through reflection. Thus the 
chapter ties in with current posthumanist debates that radically question human 
self-determination by recognizing animality as an intrinsic and inseparable 
feature of being human. 
Joseph Fracchia’s “Organisms and Objectifications: A historical-materialist 
inquiry into the Human as Animal” emphasizes Karl Marx’s significance for a 
substantially new way of conceptualizing the rethinking of history “up from the 
body” rather than grounding it in the human mind. The essay dovetails with 
chapter one as it emphasizes the importance of Darwin’s materialist conception 
of natural history for modern views on human phylogeny. By situating historical 
materialism in relation to the mainstream of Western philosophical tradition, 
Fracchia not only illuminates the affinities between Feuerbach, Darwin, and Marx 
but also the latter’s anticipation of modern views on human phylogeny, including 
those by Konrad Lorenz and Richard Lewontin. The connecting link here is 
material objectification (Vergegenständlichung), a process that synchronizes 
subjective sensory perception with the encounter with the world and is inherent in 
all living beings. According to Lorenz, this process of synchronization depends on 
a species-specific set of mechanisms that allows each member of a particular 
species to adapt to the outer world through its cognitive apparatus. In other 
words, each species distinguishes itself through the corporeal manifestation of its 
cognitive apparatus. Since the cognitive apparatus of each species is shaped 
phylogenetically, one could say that the history of a species is embodied in its 
corporeal organization. In this sense Marx justifiably posits corporal organization 
as the foundation of human history and anticipates the post-Darwinian realization 
that humans are “mindful bodies” rather than “embodied minds” (Fracchia). 
Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s preconscious animalistic process of perception 
discussed in the previous chapter, Fracchia’s essay stresses the body’s 
dominant involvement in the evolution of human cognition. In contrast to 
Merleau-Ponty, who focuses on the perceptional aspects of the human 
experience, Marx is also interested in the productive aspects of objectification. It 
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is in this capacity of deliberate human production where Marx introduces an 
essential difference between animal and human. While humans can produce “in 
freedom” (Fracchia), that is, create something that they imagine, animals are 
much more limited in the range of their productive capacities. 
One of the most striking similarities between Marx’s notion of 
Objectification and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of human perception is their 
acknowledgment of a preconscious cognitive disposition that shapes our human 
consciousness. Thus both Marx and Merleau-Ponty seem to espouse a priori 
categories of human understanding, in the vein of Kant, without referring to the 
eighteenth-century philosopher. In chapter three, “Rationality, Animality, and 
Human Nature,” David Craig reconsiders Immanuel Kant’s view of the 
Human/Animal relation. As the subtitle suggests, Kant’s position on the 
Human/Animal distinction has already been discussed extensively in scholarship. 
In contrast to most traditional Kant scholars who emphasize Kant’s strict 
separation of rational humanity and irrational animality, Craig points out that Kant 
regards animality as an inherent part of human nature that is not to be dismissed. 
Whereas most scholars who have dealt with this topic focused on Kant’s ethical 
writings, Craig includes the philosopher’s less well-known anthropological and 
pedagogical essays to shed new light on his view of the Human/Animal relation. 
While Kant maintains in his Lectures on Ethics that animals, unlike humans, lack 
moral judgment and therefore do not deserve to be judged according to moral 
principles that apply to all fellow human beings, they nevertheless deserve to be 
treated with respect. In his essay on Religion within the Boundaries of Religion, 
Kant asserts that animality is an inherent part of our human nature and it is up to 
our faculty of reason to keep our instincts in check and direct them toward a good 
purpose. Both in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and in his 
Lectures on Pedagogy Kant attributes evil rather to the misuse of Reason than to 
the instincts themselves. Accordingly, the task of Reason is to discipline and 
refine our instincts in such a way that they complement our rational faculties and 
enable us to live up to the potential of a fully formed human being. Craig 
illustrates his assertion about Kant’s differentiated anthropological views by 
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pointing out discrepancies between the linear progress toward civilization in 
Kant’s description of the phylogenetic history of humankind and his more 
complex depiction of the process of individual education, which attempts to 
account for the full spectrum of human nature and challenges a one-dimensional 
Enlightenment optimism. 
Kenneth Calhoon’s essay engages with similar concerns but from 
modernist and post-structuralist perspectives. “Of Non-Vital Interest: Art, Mimicry, 
and the Phenomenon of Life,” interweaves and interrogates discourses by Lacan, 
Freud, French philosopher Roger Caillois, and German philosophers Hans Jonas 
and Theodor Adorno on the topic of seeing and being seen. It encourages us to 
rethink animism, anthropomorphism, mimicry, and mimesis in view of twentieth- 
century attempts to “dispel the subject’s felt affinity with its natural surroundings.” 
Referring to a key passage in Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus on the mimicry of 
butterflies, the essay discusses the self-awareness of being watched and the 
attempt to escape the gaze through self-effacing blending with the environment. 
In an intricate web of literary and aesthetic connotations, including a wide ranging 
spectrum of allusions to Greek mythology and the German philosophical and 
literary tradition from the Baroque to the twentieth century, the author challenges 
anthropomorphic speculations that view mimicry as nature’s meaningful device 
for protecting vulnerable species from predators. While the essay can be read as 
a critique of such utilitarian projections onto nature as they limit our view and 
ignore nature’s “ostentatious outpouring of resources” (Calhoon), it also 
deliberates on the historical shift from the early stages of humanity that regarded 
nature as animated to the modern tendency to view the world as neutral, 
nonliving matter. The essay ponders the shortcomings and contradictions in 
scientific attempts to distance the subject from its objects through visual 
observation. Such efforts to subject nature to scientific scrutiny are prone to be 
parochial as they neglect nature’s vital aspects that are still alive in so-called 
primitive cultures and the pre-Enlightenment era. 
Sander Gliboff’s essay on scholarly writings by three prominent biologists, 
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), Charles Darwin (1809-1882), and Alfred Russel 
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Wallace (1823-1913), complements the above mentioned chapters by providing 
insights into germane discussions in the life sciences in the 1860s and 1870s.  
During that time these scientists attempted to explain how the species evolved 
and diversified into races. They tackled the problem of whether the different races 
diverged already at a pre-human stage (polygenism) or whether our ancestors 
had already evolved into humans before they diversified into different races 
(monogenism). Gliboff analyzes the writings and the tree-diagrams of Haeckel, 
Darwin, and Wallace with the aim of clarifying their views on the origins of 
humans and their races. His essay points out that nineteenth-century scientific 
accounts were influenced by pre-Darwinian narratives and left a wide margin for 
speculative reasoning with far-reaching ideological implications. By comparing 
Haeckel’s family trees to the paleontologies of Darwin and Wallace, Gliboff is able to 
repudiate prevailing accounts that characterize Haeckel’s theories as antiquated 
derivatives of Romantic Naturphilosophie and as sources of Nazi racial ideology. In 
contrast to these claims Gliboff places Haeckel’s paleontology between Darwin’s 
polygenism and Wallace’s compromise between polygenism and monogenism. Both 
Darwin and Haeckel were proponents of common descent and therefore rejected the 
idea that races diverged before they reached the human stage of evolution. By 
revealing the political and cultural underpinnings of the monogenism-polygenism 
debate, the essay demonstrates how hermeneutics can contextualize and 
complement scientific theories. The chapter is ultimately an example for why the 
textual analysis practiced in the humanities is invaluable for an understanding of the 
ideological, cultural, and historical dimensions of scientific knowledge. 
The last three chapters of this volume focus on literary analyses of 
animal/human delineations, however in the broader context of German cultural 
history and philosophy. They address the potential of blurred human-animal 
distinctions to create spaces for imagining alternatives to dominant views of 
social and ethical relations. All these chapters can be linked to the tradition of 
German idealism beginning with the Enlightenment and the emancipation of the 
German educated middle class, commonly known as Bürgertum. Gail Hart’s 
essay, “The Humanity of Children from Sandmann to Struwwelpeter,” focuses on 
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the unwanted side-effects of the disciplining of children in nineteenth-century 
bourgeois education. The essay complements the Kantian idea of disciplining the 
instincts in the civilizing of human beings in so far as the two texts under 
consideration – E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann (1816) and Heinrich 
Hoffmann’s Der Struwwelpeter (1845) – present children as “abjected pre- 
humans” (Hart) who are exposed to very drastic, traumatic shock-treatments as a 
disciplinary tool. In line with the Kantian imperative that whoever violates the law 
must face the consequences, the books depict the inevitable and immediate 
punishment for the transgression of bourgeois civility and freedom in very 
dramatic fashion. While the two texts are of different genres – a novella for adults 
and “a children’s picture book in verse” – “they both consider and confirm the 
basic assumption that children are a species of non-humans” who need to be 
taught the norms of human decency (Hart). Domesticated animals, on the other 
hand, are in some of the stories “a step ahead of the children in the matter of 
humanlike-ness” and capable of teaching the unreasonable children (Hart). While 
Der Sandmann does not include any child characters, the story’s protagonist is a 
young adult who refuses to grow up, rejects the norms of bourgeois society, and 
“remains in a world of nursery horrors,” according to Hart’s argument. In an 
interesting twist, Hart reveals the inherent contradictions of nineteenth-century 
childhood pedagogy. While the children are treated as inferior, unreasonable 
creatures, who need to be socialized, they are held responsible for their bad 
decisions by ultimately bringing their punishments on themselves. In Hart’s 
words, “each Struwwelpeter child makes a free decision […] illustrating that 
freedom prevails even under the attempts to enforce norms.” The argument of 
the subversive dimension of these novels receives additional support through 
Hoffmann’s politically anti-authoritarian inclinations as a member of the 
Vorparlament in 1848 and supporter of the democratization of German society. In 
fact, Hart points out that the grossly exaggerated punishment for the 
transgressing children undermines with humor the straightforward pedagogical 
message and inspires the children’s respect for those who resist the civilizing 
norms of bourgeois society. 
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The dialectics of civilizing moral norms and the resistance to their 
constraints on individual freedom are also the focus of Dorothee Ostmeier’s 
chapter, “The Feminine Beast: Anti-moral Morality in Early 20th-Century 
Literature.” Based on close readings of passages from Bertolt Brecht’s 
Threepenny Opera and from Frank Wedekind’s plays and prose the chapter 
demonstrates how these writers undermined 19th-century moral conventions 
under the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s anti-humanist idealization of the 
human beast. Modernist writers like Brecht and Wedekind, so the argument 
goes, not only debunk repressive 19th-century morality, they also challenge the 
civilizing process. The sense of shame and propriety that individuals acquire 
during their education is based on the repression of instincts and turns the 
civilized human being against its own animal nature. The chapter makes use of 
Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am to demonstrate the alienating effect of 
moral imperatives. A painting by Ernst Kirchner, entitled Shame, as well as the 
Wedekind plays enact the objectification of Woman as Animal and Other. Yet the 
close readings of various text passages reveal that women figures are not limited 
to the victim status in their roles as masculinist projections. On the contrary, 
Wedekind’s Lulu and Brecht’s Polly, for instance, exhibit subversive powers by 
turning the tables and emancipating themselves from patriarchal moral 
repression. Ironically, their rejections of moral conventions and their 
inauthenticity, into which the male characters force them, enable them after all to 
create a new authenticity outside of the dominant patriarchal order. By embracing 
their Dionysian vitality they resist and undermine patriarchal morality that is 
based on the gendered mind-body duality. 
The rebellion against bourgeois ethics is also a central topic of Hermann 
Hesse’s Steppenwolf (1926). Alexander Mathäs reads the novel in the context of 
Nietzschean anti-humanist philosophy and more contemporary posthumanist 
theories. According to Mathäs, Hesse’s text displays many posthumanist features. It 
criticizes the humanist legacy’s mind/body hierarchy as no longer justifiable at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. It contests the premises of humanist ideas 
that presume the unity and autonomy of the individual and the implications that 
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are connected to these assumptions, such as the privileging and universalizing of 
the Western male subject by exposing the logocentrism of humanist ideology as 
historically, geographically, racially, and socially biased. Moreover, the 
protagonist’s self-interrogation reveals that his personality does not consist of a 
spiritual essence but dissolves into an accumulation of acquired conventions, 
habits, cultural and philosophical traditions, and even specific historical events 
and constellations. Hesse’s novel inverts the traditional Bildungsroman by turning 
the protagonist’s development into a process of self-dissolution. In contrast to the 
traditional Bildungsroman the protagonist’s development is an open-ended 
process of disillusionment. It does not have a static objective, for the objective is 
the protagonist’s development itself, a process that exposes the illusion of the 
mind-body dichotomy, embodied in the Steppenwolf-metaphor, as a deceptive 
hypothesis that both veils and unveils the plethora of intangible possibilities that 
reside in human existence. In sum, Mathäs’s close reading of Hesse’s text is an 
attempt to show how fiction can undermine universalist philosophical claims by 
disclosing unsolvable contradictions, ambivalences, or dilemmas through a 
variety of diegetic and non-diegetic devices. These include a multiplicity of 
narrators that dispute or relativize the actuality of the protagonists and their 
claims, or self-contradictory accounts by the characters; the dissolution of fixed 
boundaries between individual characters; i.e., the blending, mixing, and 
multiplying of characters as, for instance, in doubles or gender-bending fusions of 
characters; and the disassembling of personalities. 
As the chapter on Hesse’s novel and the other essays of this volume 
make clear, the continuously shifting animal/human divide is crucial for our 
understanding of what it means to be human in a biogenetic and socio-cultural 
sense. As there is no definitive border between animals and humans, it is 
ultimately up to scientific and philosophical discourses and literary interpretations 
to contribute to a heightened awareness of the shifting contours in specific 
disciplinary contexts. The essays of this volume will hopefully lead to more 
differentiated views on the animal/human border. In view of the interdisciplinary 
character of topics, ranging from philosophy, to history, to biology, to psychology, 
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to literature, to ethics and law, this collection will hopefully inspire cross- 
disciplinary exchanges among the humanities, the social sciences, and the 
natural sciences. 
